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The Effects of Social Security Taxes and Minimum Wages 
on Employment: Evidence from Turkey 
 
Worker-level panel data are used to analyse the separate employment effects of increases in 
the social security taxes paid by employers and increases in the minimum wage in Turkey 
between 2002 and 2005. Variation over time and among low-wage workers in the ratio of 
total labour costs to the gross wage gives rise to a natural experiment. Regression estimates 
indicate that a given increase in social security taxes has a larger negative effect on the 
probability of a worker remaining employed in the next quarter than an equal-sized increase 
in the minimum wage. This result is incompatible with the textbook model of labour supply 
and demand and suggests that workers may increase effort in response to an increase in 
wages. Consistent with this explanation, it is found that groups with the least access to the 




Minimum wages and payroll taxes both contribute to the labour costs facing employers of 
low-wage workers. When either is raised, employers must decide whether to retain those 
workers who have become more expensive to employ as a result. Under the basic labour 
supply and demand model, the same number of workers should lose their jobs when labour 
costs rise by a given amount, regardless of what policy is responsible. However, using 
Turkish data for 2002-2005, evidence is reported indicating that an increase in labour costs 
caused by a rise in social security tax rates results in greater job loss than an equal-sized 
increase in costs brought about by a rise in the minimum wage. A possible explanation is that 
workers respond to minimum wage rises by increasing their effort levels. 
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1. Introduction 
Turkey experienced a low rate of job creation during the first half-decade of the 21
st 
century, despite strong economic growth during this period. As illustrated in Figure 1, 
Gross National Income per capita increased steadily between 2001 (when the Turkish 
financial crisis ended) and 2005, however the unemployment rate actually rose during 
this  period  and  the  labour  force  participation  rate  remained  around  50%.  Moreover, 
among those in employment, only about one half is registered with the social security 
system. One possible cause of the stubbornly low employment growth is the high level of 
taxation on labour. Combined employer and employee contributions to finance pensions 
and  disability  insurance,  health  insurance,  unemployment  benefits  and  workers’ 
compensation  equal  around  40%  of  gross  wages,  which  is  high  compared  to  other 
European and OECD countries. Furthermore, a minimum wage also exists and this has 
increased sharply in recent years. Only two previous papers have examined the effect of 
changes  in  labour  costs  on  employment  levels  in  Turkey.  Betcherman  et  al.  (2010) 
studied the introduction of regionally-targeted employment subsidies in 1998 and found 
that they led to  significant  increases  in  employment among firms  registered with  the 
social security system, however much of this appeared to be the result of existing firms 
registering rather than the creation of new jobs. Using a structural model, Ozturk (2009) 
found that the presence of minimum wages, combined with inflexibility in work hours 
resulted  in  a  much  lower  level  of  female  of  labour  force  participation  than  would 
otherwise have transpired. 
This paper examines whether increases in social security taxes and minimum wages 
in recent years have had an effect on employment levels. This is done by exploiting a 
unique natural experiment which arises as a result of the structure of the Turkish social 
security system. Because there is a minimum level of social security contributions for 
each job, employers who hire workers at the lowest end of the wage distribution face a 
total labour cost that is proportionately larger than employers of workers with slightly 
higher  wages.  In  addition,  the  minimum  wage  inflates  the  wage  paid  to  low-skilled 
workers. Both social security taxes and the minimum wage impose additional costs on 
employers of low-wage workers; however, the government receives any tax payments 
whereas the worker is the beneficiary of any minimum wage rise. Hence, any differences   2 
in  employment  outcomes  between  the  two  policies  may  reflect  differences  in  the 
behaviour of workers in response to changes in their wages. Longitudinal data from the 
Turkish Household Labour Force Survey are used to examine whether workers affected 
by increases in employer social security contributions or the minimum wage have a lower 
probability of being employed in the following quarter. 
 
2. Previous empirical literature 
A number of studies have attempted to establish a link between changes in labour 
costs and employment using longitudinal data on workers. Many of these have focused 
on the impact of minimum wages. Typically, authors use a treatment variable that is 
equal to the difference between a person’s wage and the new minimum wage for those 
earning less than the latter and zero for those earning more than the new minimum wage. 
A  key  issue  has  been  how  to  construct  an  appropriate  control  group.  Among  those 
studying increases in the federal minimum wage in the United States, both Linneman 
(1982) and Ashenfelter and Card (1981) examined the effect of increases in the minimum 
Figure 1
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Sources:  GNI per capita (current US dollars): World Bank using Atlas method; labor force participation 
rate, unemployment rate and formal employment rate (fraction of jobs registered with SSK): 
author’s calculations using Household Labor Force Survey data. 
   3 
wage in 1973 and 1974. Whereas Linneman compared those earning less than the newly-
set  minimum  wage  with  those  earning  higher  wages  (and  hence  unaffected  by  the 
minimum wage rise), Ashenfelter and Card also compared those earning less than the 
new  minimum  wage  in  covered  and  uncovered  sectors.  Currie  and  Fallick  (1996) 
considered the 1980 and 1981 increases  in  the federal  minimum  using both  types  of 
control group but with fixed effects models estimated on long-term longitudinal data. 
Approaches  similar  to  Linneman’s  have  also  been  taken  in  developing  countries, 
especially in Latin America (e.g. Maloney and Nuñez Mendez 2004, Lemos 2009, Strobl 
and Walsh 2003). Other studies, such as Bell (1997) and Alatas and Cameron (2008), 
have used establishment-level data, which addresses the effects minimum wages have on 
total employment rather than on the probability of job loss among employed workers. 
A smaller number of studies have looked at the effects of other policies that influence 
the  labour  costs  of  low-wage  workers.  Kramarz  and  Philippon  (2001)  analyzed  the 
employment effects of changes in the payroll tax and subsidy system (as well as the 
minimum wage) in France, comparing workers who were directly affected by changes in 
labour costs with workers who earned slightly more. Kugler et al. (2003) used a short-
term panel to examine the effects of  labour market reforms in Spain,  which reduced 
payroll taxes and dismissal costs for workers on permanent contracts. Since these reforms 
applied  only  to  certain  demographic  groups,  they  were  able  to  construct  a  natural 
experiment. 
 
3. A brief description of the Turkish social security tax system 
Prior  to  2006,  the  Turkish  social  security  system  consisted  of  three  separate 
institutions, each responsible for a different sector of the workforce: Sosyal Sigortalar 
Kurumu (SSK) for private sector workers, Emekli Sandiği (ES) for civil servants and 
Bağ-Kur (BK) for self-employed workers and farmers.
1 SSK accounted for roughly 60% 
of the insured population, while ES and BK accounted for about 20% each (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 1999). Since this study looks only at wage 
earners, it will focus on those covered by SSK or ES. 
                                                 
1 Under reforms enacted in May 2006 and January 2007, the three systems were merged.   4 
Under the ES system, employers and employees contributed to a single pension and 
health fund. During the sample period, employers contributed 20% of the gross wage; 
employees contributed 15% of the gross wage before April 2003 and 16% thereafter. 
Since the employer contribution rate was unchanged during the period, this group  of 
workers will serve as one comparison group in the regression analysis. In the private 
sector, which is covered by SSK, both employers and employees contributed a fraction of 
the gross wage to a social security fund and an unemployment insurance fund. The social 
security  fund  covered  a  variety  of  forms  of  insurance:  invalidity,  old-age  and  death; 
employment injury and  occupational  diseases;  sickness; and maternity.  The employer 
contribution rate for this was 19.5% and the employee contribution rate was 14%. For the 
unemployment insurance fund, the employer contribution rate was 2% and the employee 
contribution  rate  was  1%.  However,  there  were  minimum  and  maximum  monthly 
contribution levels for the two funds. When the wage exceeded a contribution ceiling, 
both  employers  and  employees  contributed a fixed  lira  amount to  the  social  security 
system. On the other hand, workers with wages below a contribution base level faced the 
standard contribution rate, while their employers paid an amount in excess of the usual 
contribution  rate  in  order  to  cover  the  shortfall  in  the  combined  social  security 
contributions of the two parties. 
Both the contribution base and contribution ceiling changed regularly over time, as 
shown in Table 1. In most cases, these levels were increased in order to keep pace with 
inflation. A monthly minimum wage also exists. This was raised five times during the 
sample period, thus adding to total labour costs for employers of low-wage workers. 
Starting  in  July  2004,  the  contribution  base  and  minimum  wage  were  synchronized, 
meaning that employers never faced a contribution rate above 21.5%. Employees also 
pay a stamp tax equal to 0.6% of their gross wage and an income tax, which is based on 
their income net of social security contributions.
2 The income tax system is progressive, 
with 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 35% and 40% marginal tax rates, although th e last of these 
was eliminated in 2005. The income brackets corresponding to these were steadily 
increased between 2002 and 2005. 
                                                 
2 A standard deduction was also applied to every person’s gross income prior to 2004.   5 
Figure 2 depicts the ratio of the total monthly labour cost faced by employers to the 
gross wage for those quarters in which the contribution base changed in 2002 and 2003 
and for wage rates less than TL 500 million. After 2004, the ratio is always equal to 1.215 
in this wage range because the contribution base is set equal to the minimum wage. The 
downward-sloping sections of the total labour cost curves before 2004 reflect the fact 
both that employers have to contribute more to the social security system as the wage 
falls  and  that  this  constitutes  a  larger  fraction  of  the  gross  wage.  This  results  in  an 
effective tax rate that can be much higher than the standard 21.5% – up to 39.6% in the 
second half of 2003. In addition to the situation depicted for low wage earners, the total 
labour cost/wage ratio falls below 1.215 at wages above the contribution ceiling, since 
employer  contributions  are  fixed  in  this  region.  These  facts  suggest  that  it  may  be 
possible to construct two natural experiments. The employment effects of changes in the 
contribution base or minimum wage that influence the total labour cost ratio among low-
wage  workers  can  be  analyzed.  Although  not  depicted  in  Figure  2,  variation  in  the 
contribution ceiling can be used in a similar fashion to examine the effect of payroll taxes 
on the employment of high-wage workers. 
Increases in the minimum wage and contribution base both lead to rises in the total 
cost  of  labour  faced  by  employers,  however  these  take  different  forms.  The  former 
involves a transfer of money from employers to their employees; the latter a transfer from 
Table 1 
Minimum wages and social security tax parameters 
 
Period introduced  Minimum wage (TL)  Contribution base (TL)  Contribution ceiling (TL) 
2002i  222,000,750  210,000,000  1,050,000,000 
2002ii  222,000,750  277,872,000  1,389,360,000 
2002iii  250,875,000  327,583,290  1,637,916,450 
2003i  306,000,000  327,583,290  1,637,916,450 
2003ii  306,000,000  393,099,960  1,965,499,800 
2003iii  306,000,000  458,015,820  2,290,079,100 
2004i  423,000,000  423,000,000  2,748,150,000 
2004iii  444,150,000  444,150,000  2,886,975,000 
2005i  488,700,000  488,700,000  3,176,700,000 
Notes:  The contribution base was less than the minimum wage in the first quarter 2002, meaning that it is 
non-binding. 
    The actual contribution base in the first half of 2004 was TL 549,630,000, however government 
subsidies meant that the effective base was TL 423,000,000. 
    Throughout  this  period,  employers  faced  a  social  security  contribution  rate  of  19.5%  and  an 
unemployment insurance contribution rate of 2%.   6 
employers to the government. The two cases are illustrated in Figure 3, which assumes 
that the minimum wage is less than the contribution base so that there is a downward-
sloping  portion  of  the  total  labour  cost  curve.  Figure  3a  depicts  the  case  where  the 
minimum wage is increased from w0 to w1. This is represented as a movement along the 
total labour cost curve. The total labour cost incurred by an employer of a minimum wage 
worker rises from w0T0 to w1T1.
3 In contrast, an increase in the contribution base is shown 
in Figure 3b. Here the total  labour cost curve itself shifts upwards, from  TLC0 to TLC1, 
and the employer of a worker earning a wage, w0, less than the new contribution base, 
faces a rise in total labour cost from w0T0 to w0T1. Since even if both the minimum wage 
and contribution base rise simultaneously (as in July 2002), the increase in labour costs 
can  be  decomposed  into  a  movement  along  the  total  labour  cost  curve  (due  to  the 
                                                 
3 w1T1 > w0T0 because the slope of the total labor cost curve is always less than 1 in absolute value. 
Figure 2 
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   7 
minimum wage) and a shift of the curve (due to the contribution base), separate treatment 
variables can be constructed for the two sources of cost increase. 
 
4. Data 
Quarterly data from the Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS) for 2002 to 2005 
are  analyzed.
4  In  addition  to  basic  demographic  information,  the  survey  collects 
information on whether a person is currently emp loyed and, if so, whether his/her main 
job  is registered with  one of the three social security institutions.  Workers  who are 
registered with SSK or ES are considered to work in the formal sector and be subject to 
minimum wage and social security legislation, while employees who are unregistered are 
considered to be in the informal sector and not bound by this legislation.
5 Self-employed 
workers (who are covered by BK) are excluded from the analysis. 
                                                 
4 Questions on a respondent’s income have only been included in the HLFS since 2002. During 2002, the 
Turkish economy was recovering from the financial crisis, which may have disrupted the labor market in 
that year. However, the results in the next section are very similar if the sample period is restricted to 2003-
2005. 
5 Kanbur (2009) discusses the various concepts of informal employment and classifies them into the cases 
where regulation is applicable but the firm is non -compliant, where regulation is non-applicable after the 
firm adjusts its activity and where regulation is non -applicable to the activity. Since  all jobs should be 
registered for social security purposes in Turkey, here informal employment refers only to the first of these 
classifications; therefore it seems reasonable to assume that the firm will ignore minimum wage legisla tion 
too. 
b. Increase in contribution base  a. Increase in minimum wage 
Figure 3 
Effects of increases in the minimum wage and contribution base 
TLC/w 











1   8 
A person’s net income from this job in the previous month is also recorded. For 
people who reported working only part of the month, income was scaled up to reflect a 
full-month amount. Gross monthly income and total labour cost were calculated from this, 
using parameters from the income tax and social security systems for the relevant quarter 
under the assumption that each person earns the same  amount in  each month of the 
calendar  year.  Although  the  Turkish  lira  was  redenominated  in  January  2005,  all 
monetary values in this paper are expressed in old lira (TL). 54 observations for workers 
who earned a very low monthly income (less than TL 10 million in January 2002 lira) 
and 182 observations for workers who earned a very high income (more than TL 10 
billion) were excluded. 
The gross wage distribution among those in the formal sector is depicted in Figure 4, 
along  with  the  prevailing  minimum  wage.
6 The  histograms  are  restricted  to  those 
observations with gross wages between  TL  0 and  TL 1 billion.  A low level of non -
compliance is observed, with few observations signif icantly below the minimum. T he 
minimum wage did not appear to be a binding constraint during 2002 and 2003, however 
after a 38% increase in January 2004 it is seen to have a clear impact on the wage 
distribution. The large spike at the minimum wage suggests that many workers who were 
previously paid less than the new minimum wage are not laid off but rather are retained 
and paid a higher amount. This is similar to the pattern Card and Krueger (1995) found in 
the United States.
7 
Table 2 reveals how the obser ved wage distribution relates to the social security 
system, as discussed in the previous section. The majority of people earn a wage that lies 
between the contribution base and the contribution ceiling  and hence have a constant 
employer contribution rate. A significant number of workers in registered jobs earn less 
than the minimum wage, although  since many of these earn only slightly less than the 
minimum this does not necessarily indicate non-compliance, given that the gross wage is 
calculated from the net wage and hence is subject to measurement error. Very few people  
                                                 
6 The  wage  distribution  in  the  informal  sector  does  not  appear  to  be  bound  by  the  minimum  wage, 
suggesting that Turkey does not display the so-called “lighthouse effect” seen in Latin America, whereby 
minimum wages influence wage setting in the unregulated sector (Maloney and Nuñez (2004)). 
7 As Card and Krueger noted, this finding is at odds with a strict interpretation of the neoclassical model of 
labor supply and demand, in which workers should never be employed at a wage exceeding their margin al 
product of labor.   9 
earn a wage in excess of the contribution ceiling. For this reason, the analysis in the next 
section will focus on the natural experiment that arises from changes in the contribution 
base and minimum wage.
8 
Households are sampled by the HLFS for two consecutive quarters, then exit for two 
                                                 
8 Despite this, similar results  were found  when the employment effects of changes in  the contribution 
ceiling were analyzed. 
Figure 4 
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Notes:  Vertical spike denotes prevailing minimum wage. 
Only individuals with gross monthly wages less than or equal to TL 1 billion are included.   10 
quarters and return for two final quarters. Hence, households are observed in the same 
two quarters in adjacent years. Unfortunately, however, it was only possible to match 
households within each calendar year, meaning that the minimum wage and contribution 
base changes that took place in the first quarters of 2003, 2004 (when the contribution 
base actually fell) or 2005 could not be analyzed. Furthermore, a combination of survey 
attrition and missing longitudinal identification variables means that some households 
only have one observation in a year and hence cannot be used in the panel analysis.
9 To 
allow for the facts that the match rates change over time and that the survey was enlarged 
considerably in 2004, the HLFS sampling weights are adjusted so that the total weight of 
each quarter’s observations is the same.
10 
 
                                                 
9 Tunalı (2009) examined attrition in the HLFS and found that household heads who are unemployed at the 
time of their initial interview are significantly more likely than average to exit the survey within three 
months.  This  is  likely  to  introduce  bias,  although  by  focusing  only  on  those  people  who  are  initially 
employed, this study should largely avoid this. Further confidence is taken from the fact that the matched 
and non-matched households are very similar in terms of observable characteristics, as can verified by 
comparing Table A1 with Table 3. 
10 This does not affect any of the regression results that are presented later. 
Table 2 
Wage distribution by quarter 
 
Quarter  Wage less than 
minimum wage 
Wage between 







2002i  17.75%  –  75.62%  6.63% 
2002ii  20.67%  16.52%  59.50%  3.31% 
2002iii  22.45%  15.78%  59.95%  1.82% 
2002iv  18.50%  16.73%  62.56%  2.21% 
2003i  25.50%  3.28%  68.52%  2.70% 
2003ii  20.20%  15.62%  61.89%  2.28% 
2003iii  15.82%  27.41%  54.52%  2.24% 
2003iv  14.74%  25.62%  57.01%  2.63% 
2004i  32.54%  –  67.42%  0.05% 
2004ii  24.23%  –  74.52%  1.25% 
2004iii  23.20%  –  75.59%  1.21% 
2004iv  16.80%  –  81.98%  1.22% 
2005i  17.73%  –  80.93%  1.33% 
2005ii  13.85%  –  84.99%  1.16% 
2005iii  12.83%  –  85.49%  1.68% 
2005iv  11.90%  –  86.37%  1.73% 
Notes:  All percentages are restricted to ages 16-64 and use the HLFS sampling weight. 
    Observations with real gross wages less than TL 10 million or greater than TL 10 billion (in 
January 2002 lira) are dropped.   11 
5. Empirical approach 
  The objective is to assess the impact of a change in the total labour cost associated 
with a person’s job on his/her future likelihood of being employed. Following Currie and 
Fallick  (1996)  and  Kramarz  and  Philippon  (2001),  this  is  done  by  constructing  a 
treatment variable, reflecting the “intensity” of a policy change on each individual. The 
total labour cost of each worker is first calculated, based on his/her observed gross wage 
in a given period. The total labour cost that would be incurred by the employer s periods 
in the future is then calculated, under the assumption that the worker remained employed 
at the initial period’s wage and taking into account any changes in the social security 
contribution base or minimum wage. The treatment variable, y, is the difference between 
the two total labour cost values, expressed in billions of lira: 
 
000 , 000 , 000 , 1
) ( ) ( it t it s t
it




 ,  (1) 
where  ) ( t TLC  is a function returning the total labour cost in period t for any gross wage. 
Hence, y reflects a counterfactual change in labour costs that would be faced by a firm if 
it chose to continue hiring a worker at the same wage. This will be equal to zero for 
workers whose cost does not change from between periods and, in order to focus on low-
wage workers, it is also set equal to zero for workers who are affected by increases in the 
contribution  ceiling.  The  larger  a  worker’s  value  of  y,  the  more  changes  in  policies 
governing payroll taxes or the minimum wage have influenced his/her labour cost. Currie 
and Fallick referred to y as a “wage gap”, although here it is more properly termed a 
“total labour cost gap”. As discussed earlier, the total labour cost gap can be decomposed 
into the portion due to  changes in the minimum wage, 
MW y , and the portion due to 
changes in the contribution base, 




it it y y y   . Since the contribution 
base was set equal to the minimum wage in 2004,  0 
CB
it y  after this point. 
  In the panel dataset discussed in the previous section, households are observed twice 
in a given  year: in  quarters  t  and  s t  , where  1  s  or  3  s . Similar to Currie and 
Fallick, the probability that individuals who were employed in quarter  s t   were still 
employed in quarter t is considered. The sample is restricted to those aged between 16 
and 64 and the following employment equation is estimated by probit, using the adjusted   12 
survey weights discussed earlier: 
  it t s t i s t i it y E          β X ) ( ) ( .  (2) 
  The dependent variable here,  it E ,  is  a  dummy  variable  for  whether  person  i  is 
employed in quarter t, given that  1 ) (  s t i E . Quarter dummies, λ, are included to control 
for  macroeconomic  factors  and  X  includes  age,  sex,  urban  status,  marital  status, 
education level, whether the person was employed in an unregistered job in  s t   and a 
dummy for whether there was a nine month gap between interviews rather than a three 
month gap (i.e. whether  3  s ). 
  The treatment group here consists of those workers who were registered with SSK in 
s t   at a wage between the old contribution base and the new minimum wage (and hence 
experienced an increase in total labour costs). In periods where neither the contribution 
base nor the minimum wage changes, this group is empty. The comparison group consists 
of three subgroups: workers who earned more than the new minimum wage but less than 
TL 500 million (in January 2002 lira) in  s t  ; workers who were either registered with 
ES  or not  registered with  any social security institution  in  s t   and earned a  wage 
between the old contribution base and the new minimum; and wage earners who were not 
registered  in  s t   and earned less than the old minimum.
11 Hence, low-wage private 
sector workers will be compared with slightly higher-earning private sector workers and 
workers in the public and informal sectors. 
 
6. Results 
  Means for key demographic and employment variables for the regression sample are 
presented in the first column of Table 3. Relative to the working-age population, the 
sample is dominated by men, the more educated, those who are married and those living 
in cities. In the second and third columns of the table, means for those who are bound by 
changes in the total cost schedule (so that  0  it y ) and those who are not bound (so that 
0  it y ) are reported. Not surprisingly, those who are affected by the policy changes are 
                                                 
11 A small number of people (1.9% of the sample) were dropped from the dataset because they reported a 
wage that was less than 95% of the prevailing minimum wage but claimed to be registered with SSK or ES. 
Those within 5% of the minimum are included because of the measurement error problem discussed earlier.   13 
younger and less likely to be married than the comparison group. 
  The first column of Table 4 presents the results of estimating Equation 2. There is 
significant evidence that an increase in total labour cost brought about by the minimum 
wage rise reduces a person’s likelihood of remaining employed: at the mean, a TL 1 
million (approximately equal to US $0.70) increase in the total labour cost gap reduces 
the probability of being employed by 0.23%. This implies that a 1% increase in the total 
labour cost of a treated worker yields a 3.0% fall in the probability of him/her remaining 
employed  a  quarter  later.  The  other  control  variables  have  the  expected  signs:  being 
younger, male, married and more educated and living in an urban area all increase the 
likelihood of employment, as does being in a registered job in the previous quarter. 
  As discussed earlier, the total labour cost gap can be decomposed into a minimum 
wage cost gap and a contribution base cost gap. In order to find the separate employment 
effects  of  changes  in  each,  the  second  column  of  Table  4  reports  estimates  of  the 
following equation: 






it y y E             β X ) ( ) ( ) ( .  (3) 
  A TL 1 million increase in labour costs resulting from an increase in the contribution 
base is found to lead to a 0. 28% fall in the probability of remaining employed, whereas 
Table 3 
Means for the regression samples 
 
Variable  Total sample  Bound workers  Unbound workers 
Age  31.810  31.081  31.953 
Male  0.797  0.770  0.802 
Urban  0.757  0.794  0.750 
Married  0.680  0.699  0.676 
Primary education  0.539  0.538  0.540 
Secondary education  0.390  0.410  0.386 
Tertiary education  0.049  0.043  0.051 
Previously employed in registered job  0.573  1  0.489 
Total cost gap  0.003  0.018  0 
Minimum wage cost gap  0.001  0.005  0 
Contribution base cost gap  0.002  0.013  0 
Previous gross monthly income  TL 428,240,646  TL 317,015,028  TL 450,269,268 
Employed  0.763  0.795  0.756 
Number of observations  36,979  3,793  33,186 
Notes:  The  samples  are  restricted  to  those  aged  16-64  who  were  employed  in  the  previous  quarter 
surveyed and use the HLFS sampling weights, adjusted so that the total weight in each quarter is 
the same.   14 
the same increase in costs resulting from an increase in the minimum wage results in only 
a  0.13%  decrease  in  the  probability  of  employment.  This  difference  is  statistically 
significant at the 5% level and runs counter to the predictions of the basic textbook model 
of labour demand, in which the disemployment effects that result from the imposition of 
a payroll tax should never exceed those resulting from the imposition of a minimum wage 
which increases the equilibrium wage by an equal amount, because in the former case the 
employer may be able to pass on some of the tax to the worker in the form of lower 
wages. In contrast, the results here indicate that employers are less likely to shed workers 
if an increase in labour costs results in a transfer to employees rather than the government. 
  The  estimated  coefficients  on  Currie  and  Fallick’s  (1996)  wage  gap  imply  an 
employment elasticity with respect to the minimum wage of -0.23 when OLS is used. 
Table 4 
Marginal effects from probit estimation of employment equations 
 
Variable  Employed  Employed in same job 
(i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv) 
Total cost gap  -2.257*** 
(0.279)  –  -3.160*** 
(0.310)  – 
Minimum wage cost gap  –  -1.309*** 
(0.508)  –  -1.997*** 
(0.557) 
Contribution base cost gap  –  -2.839*** 
(0.379)  –  -3.888*** 
(0.422) 


































































Pseudo R-squared  0.080  0.080  0.074  0.074 
Number of observations  36,979  36,979  36,928  36,928 
Notes:  All models include dummy variables for each quarter (12 variables). 
    Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. 
    Regressions use HLFS sampling weights, adjusted so that the total weight in each quarter is the 
same.   15 
This is remarkably close to the -0.26 figure that is obtained from the regression in the 
second column of Table 4 (using the fact that bound workers experienced an average 
2.7% increase in the minimum wage). Currie and Fallick’s elasticity falls slightly to -0.20 
when they switch to fixed effects estimation, suggesting that the coefficients in Table 4 
may overstate the true values. Since the HLFS data allow only one observation for each 
person, it is not possible to include individual fixed effects here, however including a 
dummy for registered job in the previous quarter controls for differences in employment 
stability between workers in the informal and formal sectors. 
  The HLFS asks respondents how long they had been employed in their current job; 
therefore, it is possible to determine whether a person had left a given job since the 
previous quarter. The last two columns of Table 4 estimate Equations 2 and 3 again, 
where the dependent variable now indicates whether a person is employed in the same 
job in quarter t as in quarter  s t  . Not surprisingly, the effects of all treatment variables 
are larger than in the previous columns. A  TL 1 million increase in total labour costs 
results in a 0.32% increase in the probability of workers leaving their current jobs, but 
only a 0.23% increase in the probability of them leaving the wage and salary sector 
altogether, because many find other jobs. Once again, the effects of the minimum wage 
cost gap and the contribution base cost gap are significantly different from each other. 
 
7. Sensitivity tests 
  Card and Krueger (1995) criticized Linneman’s (1982) decision to compare minimum 
wage workers with those earning more than the minimum wage, noting that the former 
group is likely to have more unstable employment histories than the latter, even in years 
in which the minimum wage did not change. Although the sample excludes those initially 
earning more than TL 500 million to alleviate this problem, it is still possible that the 
effects  in  Table  4  reflect  a  turnover-wage  relationship.  One  way  to  circumvent  this 
criticism is to add a person’s gross monthly income in the previous period to the set of 
controls in Equation 3. Although unreported, this is found to reduce the magnitude of the 
coefficients on the cost gap variables only slightly. 
  Card and Krueger’s preferred approach is to restrict the sample of workers to those 
who  initially  have  low  wage  rates,  thereby  creating  a  more  homogenous  comparison   16 
group.  Table  5  reports  estimates  of  Equations  2  and  3,  using  only  one  of  the  three 
comparison groups in each column (except the first column, which repeats the baseline 
results from Table 4). In the second column, the workers who are bound by the policy 
changes are compared with those who earn higher wages (but less than TL 500 million). 
As Card and Krueger predicted, the minimum wage effect is larger in this regression, 
although  interestingly  the  contribution  base  effect  is  smaller  and  the  two  are  not 
significantly different. In the third column, the comparison group is comprised of those 
who  earn  less  than  the  bound  group.  In  this  case,  the  minimum  wage  effect  is 
insignificant but the contribution base effect is similar to the baseline case. In the final 
column, the bound group is compared with workers whose earnings are in the same range 
but who are either not registered for social security purposes or registered with ES. This 
is comparable to the approach taken by Ashenfelter and Card (1981). The contribution 
base effect is larger than in the baseline case although, once again, the minimum wage 
effect is insignificant. In both the third and fourth columns, the contribution base effect is 
significantly larger than the minimum wage effect at the 10% level. 
  Focusing only on changes in employment status precludes the possibility that some of 
the adjustment in employment levels takes place in terms of the amount of time worked 
by each worker rather than in the number of workers. To examine this so-called intensive 
Table 5 
Marginal effects from probit estimation of employment equations using different comparison groups 
 









Single treatment variable 






























observations  36,979  26,208  12,524  5,833 
Notes:  All models also include the same regressors as in Table 4. 
    Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
    Regressions use HLFS sampling weights, adjusted so that the total weight in each quarter is the 
same.   17 
margin, in Table 6 the regressions from Table 4 are repeated, but including only those 
who remain employed in current quarter (in the first two columns) or employed in the 
same job (in the last two columns). In the first column, the change from the previous 
quarter in the number of days worked in the previous month is used as a dependent 
variable.  A  TL  1  million  increase  in  the  minimum  wage  cost  gap  leads  to  a  0.016 
decrease in the number of days worked per month but an equal-sized increase in the 
contribution base cost gap results in a 0.032 fall in days worked. The contribution base is 
also found to result in a larger fall in the number of hours worked per week than the 
minimum wage, as seen in the second column of the table. In both the days and hours 
regressions, the minimum wage and contribution base effects are significantly different 
from each other, although both are modest in magnitude. Similar patterns are found when 
the regression is restricted to those who remain in the job they had in the previous quarter, 
as reported in the third and fourth columns of Table 6. 
  Another  concern  is  that  the  results  simply  capture  a  trend  towards  lower  labour 
demand elasticities over time. Since the contribution base changes occurred only during 
the first  part of the sample period, it is possible that they may  appear to  have large 
disemployment  effects  compared  to  the  minimum  wage  changes,  which  occurred 
throughout  the  sample  period.  To  address  this,  the  two  treatment  variables  were 
Table 6 
Estimates of equations for changes in the number of days and weekly hours worked 
 
Variables  Employed  Employed in same job 
(i) 
Change in days 
(ii) 
Change in hours 
(iii) 
Change in days 
(iv) 
Change in hours 
Single treatment variable 






























observations  28,433  28,340  25,637  25,595 
Notes:  All models also include the same regressors as in Table 4. 
    Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
    Regressions use HLFS sampling weights, adjusted so that the total weight in each quarter is the 
same.   18 
interacted with year dummies, as presented in Table 7. As suspected, the coefficients on 
the  treatment  variables  declined  over  time,  although  the  contribution  base  effect  is 
consistently larger than the minimum wage effect and the difference between the two in 
2002 (the only year they are both identified) is significant. 
 
8. Possible explanations 
  Minimum wages have been found to cause only modest reductions in employment 
levels in other developing countries, as noted by Neumark and Wascher (2007) in their 
survey  of  the  literature.  The  most  common  explanations  for  this  are  the  presence  of 
monopsonies or the fact that labour demand is very elastic at low wage rates. In either 
case,  any  given  increase  in  the  cost  of  labour  should  lead  to  the  same  change  in 
employment, regardless of the reason behind it.
12 This is contradicted by the evidence 
presented above, which indicates that changes in  labour  costs have more effect on 
employment probabilities when they are caused by changes in payroll taxes rather than 
by changes in minimum wages. The obvious difference between these two types of policy 
                                                 
12 If anything, a payroll tax increase might have a smaller effect if firms are able to offset the tax by 
lowering wages. This can be examined using the HLFS data on workers who remain employed between 
quarters. However, the results from such an analysis were found to be very sensitive to the exclusion of 
implausibly large wage changes, something that was also noted by Currie and Fallick (1996). 
Table 7 
Marginal effects from probit estimation of employment equations with year interactions 
 
Variable  Year 
2002  2003  2004  2005 
Single treatment variable 





(0.694)  – 




(0.867)  –  -0.511 






(0.451)  –  – 
Notes:  All models also include the same regressors as in Table 4. 
    Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
    Regressions use HLFS sampling weights, adjusted so that the total weight in each quarter is the 
same. 
    It is not possible to obtain separate effects of the minimum wage cost gap in 2003 or 2005 or of 
the contribution base cost gap in 2004 or 2005, because the variables did not change during those 
years.   19 
is that a minimum wage rise results in an increase in the take-home pay of the worker, 
whereas  an  increase  in  payroll  taxes  leaves  the  worker’s  pay  unchanged.  If  workers 
respond to wage increases by putting more effort into their work or by reducing the 
probability of quitting their job, then employers will actually experience rises in labour 
productivity as a result of a minimum wage rise, but not from an equal-sized increase in 
payroll taxes. As shown by Rebitzer and Taylor (1995), they will then be less eager to cut 
jobs under the former policy than under the latter.
13 
  This efficiency wage argument is particularly relevant to Turkey, where the loss of a 
job in the formal sector often forces workers to find employment in the informal sector, at 
a much lower wage rate.
14 Since these jobs are unaffected by social security taxes or the 
minimum wage, they are  assumed to pay a worker his/her marginal product.  Formal 
sector workers who do not raise their effort levels (or reduce their probability of turnover) 
in response to a rise in their wage rate s have the option of switching  to the informal 
sector and continuing to earn their old wage in return for a lower effort level. 
  Certain demographic groups are much more likely to work in the informal sector than 
others. For example,  31% of workers with a  primary education work in the  informal 
sector, while only 14% of secondary-educated workers do. For groups with less recourse 
to the informal sector, the only alternative to minimum wage employment is likely to be 
unemployment.
15 Assuming that  the unemployment benefit is lo wer than any informal 
sector wage, it might be expected that changes in the minimum wage would have larger 
disemployment effects on  these  workers. To examine this, Equation 3 is estimated 
separately for each sex, urban status, age and education group. Table 8 indicates that the 
contribution base effect continues to dominate the minimum wage effect in all cases. 
Women are found to be more likely to exit employment in response to a given increase in 
labour costs than men, consistent with Ashenfelter and Card (1981), but not Wellington 
                                                 
13 Georgiadis (2008) found support for the efficiency wage argument, by analyzing a natural experiment 
arising from the national minimum wage in the United Kingdom. Although Georgiadis’s paper remedies 
some of the limitations of previous studies of efficiency wages, it shares the weakness of not having a 
counterfactual measure of employment when wages rise but worker incentives are not present. 
14 Controlling for other characteristics, workers in jobs registered with SSK were found to earn 34% more 
after tax than unregistered workers. 
15 Another possibility is that workers might become self employed, which is also likely to result in a fall in 
income. The prevalence of self employment across demographic groups follows a similar pattern to that of 
informal employment.   20 
(1991). Rural-dwellers are affected slightly more by rises in labour costs (especially due 
to the minimum wage) than those living in urban areas. People aged under 30 have higher 
disemployment probabilities than older workers, however, somewhat surprisingly, people 
with secondary or tertiary educations are more likely to lose their jobs in response to 
labour cost increases than less-educated workers. This is likely to be due to the fact that 
those  with  more  education  tend  to  be  younger  and,  hence,  more  vulnerable  to 
unemployment than older workers (see Economic Research Forum 2005). 
  Since changes in the contribution base measures pure changes in labour demand and 
changes in the minimum wage confound this effect with the productivity responses of 
workers,  the  difference  in  the  coefficients  on  the  minimum  wage  cost  gap  and  the 
contribution base cost gap can be interpreted as an employee “productivity effect”. When 
the probability of leaving a particular job is used as a dependent variable in the last 
column  of  Table  4,  the  productivity  effect  is  found  to  increase  the  probability  of 
Table 8 
Marginal effects from probit estimation of employment equations for different subgroups 
 
Subgroup  (i) 
Employed 
(ii) 




 ǆ  
CB
 ǆ  
MW
 ǆ  
CB
 ǆ  
CB MW
  ǆ ǆ   








2.849  0.170 








1.883  0.207 








1.338  0.232 








2.036  0.191 








0.596  0.264 









































1.441  0.030 
Notes:  All models also include the same regressors as in Table 4. 
    Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
    Regressions use HLFS sampling weights, adjusted so that the total weight in each quarter is the 
same.   21 
remaining employed by 0.19% in response to a TL 1 million labour cost increase. In 
Table 7, the largest productivity effects found are for women, urban-dwellers, those aged 
30-64 and those with a secondary education. Except for women, these groups all also 
have significantly lower fractions of informal sector jobs than the rest of the workforce. 
Since workers who change jobs are likely to find work in the  informal sector where 
possible, the productivity effects should be more similar across groups of workers when 
the probability of being employed in any job is analyzed. This is found in all cases, as 
seen in the first column of the table.   
  If  efficiency  wages  explain  the  lack  of  adjustment  in  employment  to  changes  in 
minimum wages, workers might be expected to reduce hours spent on additional jobs in 
response to a minimum wage rise, as they devote more effort to their main job. The 
HLFS asks questions on a person’s usual weekly hours on any secondary job, including 
unpaid family work. Table A2 presents the results when the change in this variable is 
regressed on the treatment variables. Unfortunately, only around 2% of workers report 
having a secondary job in each quarter. Nevertheless, the minimum wage cost gap has a 
significant negative effect on hours worked on the secondary job (which is zero for those 
without a secondary job), even though it has little effect on hours worked on the main job. 
This is consistent with a worker cutting back on other labour market activities in order to 
devote more effort to his/her main job after the wage on that job rises. The effect is even 
larger for those who are still employed in the same main job as in the previous period 
(and who are presumably now receiving a higher wage on that main job). The same result 
is found if unpaid work is excluded. The contribution base cost gap has no effect on 
hours worked on the secondary job. 
 
9. Overall employment changes 
  The previous results indicate that the likelihood of workers losing their jobs increases 
when the cost of hiring them rises and by more so when the cost increase is due to an 
increase  in  the  contribution  base  than  in  the  minimum  wage.  One  drawback  of  this 
approach is that it is unable to determine whether changes in labour costs affect the flow 
of people into employment. It is possible that increases in the contribution base do not 
reduce  overall  employment  but  simply  increase  the  amount  of  labour  turnover,  as   22 
employers  suddenly  find  it  worthwhile  replacing  unproductive  workers  with  more 
carefully selected new hires. An alternative approach is to aggregate the treatment and 
employment variables within broadly-defined categories and construct a “pseudo-panel” 
dataset.
16 This allows examination of the effect of changes in the cost gap variables on 
the total level of employment within  specific groups of workers, rather than on just an 
individual’s probability of exiting employment. 
  Birth cohort, sex, education, urban/rural status and industry were used as categories, 
in order to identify workers who are broadly similar in productive characteristics and who 
do similar jobs.
17 The total number of employed workers within each cell was calculated, 
using the survey weights, so that  the values reflect the national level of employment 
within each category.  Table 9 reports the results of estimating employment equations 
using the pseudo-panel. Since the actual number of workers in each cell is not of interest, 
elasticities are reported in the table instead. Fixed effects estimation is used to control for 
persistent  differences  in  employment  between  the  cells .  In  the  first  column,  total 
employment in each cell (excluding self employment, as before) is used as the dependent 
variable. A 1% increase in the contribution base cost gap is seen to result in a 0.0 2% 
decrease  in  employment,  while  the  minimum  wage  cost  gap  is  found  to  have  no 
significant effect on employment. As with the individual -level analysis, the difference 
between the two effec ts is significant. These results suggest that although employers 
might seek out new workers in response to increases in labour costs, the overall effect of 
increases in the contribution base on employment is negative. 
  Table 9 also presents estimates of th e effects of the  cost gap variables  on three 
subcategories of employment: formal private  sector employment (i.e. registered jobs), 
government sector employment and informal private sector employment (i.e. unregistered 
jobs).  The  minimum  wage  cost  gap  has  no  effect  on  employment  in  any  of  these 
categories.  The  contribution  base  cost  gap  has  a  significant  negative  effect  on 
                                                 
16 This approach has been used by studies in cases where it is not possible to match individuals over time, 
for example Blundell et al. (1990) and Morrison et al. (2006). 
17 11 birth cohort categories (pre-1940 and 5-year intervals thereafter), 8 education categories (no education, 
primary school, other primary education, junior high school,   high school, undergraduate study, post-
graduate study) and 9 industry categories (ISIC 1 -digit categories) were used. Industry in quarter t–s was 
used  for  people  who  were  not  employed  at  time  t.  The unweighted  average  cell  size  was  14  and  the 
weighted average cell size was 10,350.   23 
employment  in  both  the  formal  and  government  sectors  but  no  effect  on  informal 
employment. Finally, Table 9 also reports the effects of the cost gap variables on self 
employment.  The  contribution  base  cost  gap  has  a  significant  positive  elasticity, 
suggesting that workers displaced from formal sector jobs are more likely to become self-
employed than to enter the informal sector. In contrast, the minimum wage cost gap has 
an insignificant effect on self employment. 
 
10. Conclusion 
  This  paper  has  examined  the  effects  the  minimum  wage  and  the  level  of  social 
security taxes paid by firms in Turkey have on the employment levels. Variation over 
time and among low-wage workers in the ratio of total labour costs to the gross wage 
gives  rise  to  a  natural  experiment.  Using  a  longitudinal  dataset  constructed  from  the 
Turkish  Household  Labour  Force  Survey  for  2002-2005,  estimates  were  obtained 
indicating that a TL 1 million (or US $0.70) increase in a worker’s labour costs arising 
from a minimum wage rise results in a 0.13% decrease in the probability of him/her 
remaining employed in the following quarter, whereas a TL 1 million increase in costs 
resulting  from  an  increase  in  social  security  contributions  results  in  a  0.28%  fall  in 
employment probability. The difference between the two effects is even larger when only 
low-wage  workers  are  used  as  a  comparison  group.  Certain  demographic  groups, 
including women, rural-dwellers and those under 30, are found to be more vulnerable to 
Table 9 
Elasticities from fixed effects estimation of employment equations using pseudo-panel 
 
Variable  (i) 
















































R-squared  0.794  0.790  0.742  0.741  0.886 
Number of observations  6,925  6,925  6,925  6,925  6,925 
Notes:  All models also include fixed effects for each cell and dummy variables for each quarter (12 
variables). 
    Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively.   24 
policy changes than others. The results indicate that employers are less likely to dismiss 
workers in response to a given increase in labour costs when the increase results in higher 
wages for their workers rather than in a transfer payment to the government, possibly 
because workers are likely to put more in more effort in the former case. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Means for the full HLFS sample 
 
Variable  Total sample  Bound workers  Unbound workers 
Age  31.214  30.488  31.304 
Male  0.793  0.761  0.797 
Urban  0.749  0.774  0.746 
Married  0.643  0.645  0.642 
Primary education  0.528  0.509  0.531 
Secondary education  0.400  0.440  0.395 
Tertiary education  0.049  0.040  0.050 
Employed in registered job  0.568  1  0.514 
Gross monthly income  TL 429,211,669  TL 314,211,669  TL 443,535,803 
Number of observations  99,131  9,793  89,338 
Notes:  The samples are restricted to those aged 16-64 who are employed with monthly incomes less than 
TL 500 million in January 2002 lira. They use the HLFS sampling weights, adjusted so that the 
total weight in each quarter is the same. 
    The fourth quarter of each year is excluded, as observations from these quarters can never be 
matched to a later quarter. 
    The age restrictions do not agree with those in the regression sample exactly, as the latter uses 
those aged 16-64 as of the second quarter a person is observed, not the first quarter.   27 
 
Table A2 
Estimates of equations for change in usual weekly hours worked on secondary job 
 
Variables  Employed  Employed in same main job 
(i) 
Hours on any work 
(ii) 
Hours on paid work 
(iii) 
Hours on any work 
(iv) 
Hours on paid work 
Single treatment variable 






























observations  28,340  28,340  25,595  25,595 
Notes:  All models also include the same regressors as in Table 4. 
    Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
    Regressions use HLFS sampling weights, adjusted so that the total weight in each quarter is the 
same. 